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ABSTRACT—The release of documents in recent legal battles between elite
collegiate institutions and the Students for Fair Admissions, a nonprofit
group seeking to eradicate the consideration of race in university
admissions, has brought to question measures taken by the universities to
shield information relating to their admissions processes from public view.
These materials included admissions training materials, procedures for
evaluating applications, and admitted applicant profiles and statistics. An
examination of the universities’ justifications to prevent public disclosure
of this information provides insight into their varying reliance on
intellectual property protections derived for trade secrets. These varying
justifications help illustrate the complex, ever-changing nature of trade
secret law, in which even the baseline determination of what may properly
constitute a trade secret often remains an open question. The SFFA cases
further highlight how this ambiguity provides fertile grounds for entities
with commercial interests to strain the boundaries of trade secret law to
cover business information that, if disclosed to the public, threatens
reputational harm but which may not otherwise rise to the level of trade
secret.
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INTRODUCTION
The release of documents in the most recent legal battle surrounding
affirmative action has shed light on the shadowy world of elite college
admissions1 and has brought to question measures taken by academic
institutions to shield their admissions processes from public view. On
September 30, 2019, Judge Allison D. Burroughs delivered her muchanticipated ruling regarding the accusations of plaintiff, Students for Fair
Admissions (“SFFA”), that defendants, President and Fellows of Harvard
College, and The Honorable and Reverend the Board of Overseers
(“Harvard”), employ discriminatory admissions practices against Asian
American undergraduate applicants.2 Because Harvard receives federal
funding, SFFA argued that Harvard’s admissions practices violate Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 In her ruling, Judge Burroughs concluded
that Harvard’s undergraduate admissions process “passes constitutional
muster,” meeting the strict scrutiny standard set out by the Supreme Court
for determining the legality of race-conscious admissions practices.4
Judge Burroughs’s decision comes almost one year after trial for the
case commenced in October 2018 in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts5 and almost four years after SFFA filed its initial
complaint.6 Harvard does not stand alone in the litigation crosshairs of
SFFA, a nonprofit group whose mission lies in eradicating the
consideration of race in university admissions.7 Targeting elite universities,

1 Anemona Hartocollis, Does Harvard Admissions Discriminate? The Lawsuit on Affirmative
Action, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/us/harvardaffirmative-action-asian-americans.html [https://perma.cc/LZ64-QVF7].
2 Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President &
Fellows of Harvard Coll. (Harvard Corp.), No. 14-cv-14176-ADB (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2019).
3 Complaint, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 14cv-14176-DJC (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 2014) [hereinafter SFFA Harvard Complaint]. Harvard receives
Federal financial assistance through grants and loans (accepting over $13.4 million in 2013) and by
enrolling students directly supported by Federal financial aid. Id. at 10.
4 See Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, supra note 2, at 127. In her 130-page ruling, Judge
Burroughs explained that Harvard’s admissions process is sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve the
compelling interest of “achiev[ing] diversity and the academic benefits that flow from diversity,” as the
standard of strict scrutiny requires.
5 See Hartocollis, supra note 1.
6 See SFFA Harvard Complaint, supra note 3.
7 About,
Students
for
Fair
Admissions,
https://studentsforfairadmissions.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/9B8L-TFN4]. SFFA states that it “believe[s] that racial classifications and preferences
in college admissions are unfair, unnecessary, and unconstitutional” and describes its mission as one to
“support and participate in litigation that will restore the original principles of our nation’s civil rights
movement: A student’s race and ethnicity should not be factors that either harm or help that student to
gain admission to a competitive university.” Id.
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SFFA has also accused Princeton University8 of discriminating against
Asian American applicants, and the group shows no signs of slowing its
litigious activity any time soon.9
The national spotlight on the Harvard SFFA case has only intensified
following Judge Burroughs’s ruling. A few days following the decision’s
deliverance, SFFA filed its Notice of Appeal,10 raising the possibility that
the divisive issue of affirmative action will appear before the Supreme
Court for the first time since its 2016 ruling upholding race-conscious
admissions practices in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.11 Offstage,
Harvard took measures to prevent documents detailing its admissions
processes from entering the public record during trial.12 Ultimately,
Harvard’s Motion to Seal proved unpersuasive in court.13 Princeton
University similarly took steps to shield its admissions materials from
public view through the filing of a reverse Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”) lawsuit.14
BACKGROUND
The admissions information that Harvard and Princeton sought to
keep secret are nearly identical in category and scope, including but not
limited to admissions training materials, procedures for evaluating
applications, and admitted applicant profiles and statistics.15 The
8 Complaint, Students for Fair Admissions Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 1:16-cv-02154-TSC
(D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2016) [hereinafter SFFA Princeton Complaint].
9 Edward Blum, 2019 Students for Fair Admissions Annual Report, STUDENTS FOR FAIR
ADMISSIONS 2 (Sept. 4, 2019), https://samv91khoyt2i553a2t1s05i-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/09/2019-Year-End-Review-Sept-4-2019-1-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/NDN9-GM53]
(noting filing of summary judgment motion against the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and
refiling of lawsuit against the University of Texas at Austin in April 2019).
10 Notice of Appeal, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.,
No. 1:14-cv-14176-ADB (D. Mass. Oct. 4, 2019); see also Camille G. Caldera et al., Tuesday’s
Admissions Decision is Only the First Step in a Long Appeals Process, Experts Say, HARV. CRIMSON
(Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2019/10/2/admissions-lawsuit-appeals-process/
[https://perma.cc/ET2D-24TZ].
11 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin et al., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016). The Supreme Court in
Fisher repeatedly affirmed that a compelling interest exists in fostering diversity in educational settings,
justifying the use of race-conscious admissions practices. See also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
12 Harvard’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Seal Certain Information Filed in
Connection with the Parties’ Summary Judgment Motions, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v.
President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 1:14-cv-14176-ADB (D. Mass. Jun. 22, 2018) [hereinafter
Harvard’s Motion to Seal].
13 See Hartocollis, supra note 1.
14 Complaint at 1, Tr. of Princeton Univ. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 17-cv-00485-TSC (D.D.C.
Mar. 17, 2017) [hereinafter Princeton’s Reverse FOIA].
15 See id. at 8; Harvard’s Motion to Seal, supra note 12, at 3.
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similarities fade, however, when examining the universities’ justifications
for shielding this information from the public, varying notably in their
reliance on intellectual property protections derived for trade secrets.16
These varying justifications help illustrate the complex, ever-changing
nature of trade secret law, in which even the baseline determination of what
may properly constitute a trade secret often remains an open question. The
SFFA cases further highlight how this ambiguity provides fertile grounds
for entities with commercial interests to strain the boundaries of trade
secret law to cover business information that, if disclosed to the public,
threatens reputational harm but which may not otherwise rise to the level of
trade secret.17
Though this Note relies upon the SFFA cases to help illustrate
ambiguity in trade secret law, it does not focus on providing an opinion on
or discussing the merits of SFFA’s accusations of discriminatory
admissions practices by Harvard and Princeton. Rather, this Note examines
the legal justifications employed by the universities to shield their
admissions procedures from the public and considers the possibility that
these cases illustrate attempts to use trade secret law to suppress
reputationally-harmful business information with questionable trade secret
designation.
This Note traverses these issues described in two Parts. Part I centers
around an examination of the recent SFFA cases against Harvard and
Princeton, focusing on efforts by the universities to shield their admissions
procedures from public view. This section will examine some of the
primary arguments employed by both universities and will highlight
differences in their reliance on trade secret protection justifications to
shield their admissions procedures from public view. Part II weighs the
arguments and counterarguments for whether Harvard and Princeton’s
admissions data may properly constitute trade secrets. This Part argues that
collegiate admissions data should not receive “trade secret” designation, as
this would form an improper extension of trade secret law. Part II further
considers the role that trade secret law has increasingly played in providing
companies a route to prevent public disclosure of information from the
public that may not rise to the level of a trade secret but which still
possesses controversial material capable of reputational harm. This Part
explores the lack of uniformity among the main statutory sources of trade
secret law and argues that this discord gives rise to litigation strategies
resembling those employed within the SFFA cases, in which statutory
16

See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 15; Harvard’s Motion to Seal, supra note 12, at

17

Eric E. Johnson, Trade Secret Subject Matter, 33 HAMLINE L. R. 545, 546 (2010).

12.
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ambiguity allows for a straining of the boundaries of trade secret law to
cover information capable of reputational harm but which may not have
otherwise qualified for trade secret protection.
I.

RECENT SFFA CASES AGAINST HARVARD AND PRINCETON

A. The Princeton Case: FOIA Battles and Reliance on Trade Secret
Protections
In early 2016, SFFA submitted a Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”) request to the United States Department of Education
(“Department”), seeking access to documents related to a 2015
investigation of the undergraduate admissions practices of Princeton
University by the Department and the New York Office for Civil Rights
(“OCR”).18 The Freedom of Information Act of 1967 grants citizens the
right to request records and documents from the government, subject to
nine exemptions.19 The United States Department of Justice, responsible for
overseeing FOIA requests, states that “[t]he basic function of the Freedom
of Information Act is to ensure informed citizens, vital to the functioning of
a democratic society.”20 The records SFFA wished to obtain detailed the
results of an investigation by the Department and the OCR to determine
whether Princeton employed discriminatory admissions practices against

18
19

See SFFA Princeton Complaint, supra note 8, at 2.
Nine FOIA exemptions are as follows:
Exemption 1: Information that is classified to protect national security.
Exemption 2: Information related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency.
Exemption 3: Information that is prohibited from disclosure by another federal law.
Exemption 4: Trade secrets or commercial or financial information that is confidential or
privileged.
Exemption 5: Privileged communications within or between agencies, including those
protected by the: 1. Deliberative Process Privilege (provided the records were created less
than 25 years before the date on which they were requested), 2. Attorney-Work Product
Privilege, 3. Attorney-Client Privilege.
Exemption 6: Information that, if disclosed, would invade another individual’s personal
privacy.
Exemption 7: Information compiled for law enforcement purposes . . .
Exemption 8: Information that concerns the supervision of financial institutions.
Exemption 9: Geological information on wells.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, What is FOIA?, FOIA.GOV, , https://foia.gov/about.html [https://perma.cc/92D3QWAJ].
20 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FOIA.GOV, https://foia.gov/ [https://perma.cc/5J92-NB5J].
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Asian American applicants on the basis of race, color, or national origin.21
The investigation ultimately concluded with a finding that Princeton
University had not employed discriminatory practices in its undergraduate
admissions processes.22 Nevertheless, SFFA sought access.
Princeton responded in 2017 with a reverse FOIA23 in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a permanent
injunction to “prevent the disclosure of certain confidential and
commercially sensitive documents and information relating to the
University’s undergraduate admissions program . . . .”24 In its permanent
injunction claim, Princeton divided the admissions-related materials into
two categories.25 The first category, titled “Applicant Documents and
Information,” contained materials about individual undergraduate
applicants.26 This category encompassed the application packets of specific
applicants, which included applicants’ personal essays and information
about their academic and extracurricular performance.27 It also included
data produced for the OCR’s 2015 investigation of Princeton’s admissions
practices, such as “narrative responses” to OCR questions, which described
“detailed information about specific applicants and their families.”28 Of
higher relevance to this Note is Princeton’s second category of admissions
data, titled “Admissions Documents and Information,” which contained
materials about Princeton’s confidential, propriety admissions procedures.
Specifically, this category included “documents and information” relating
to Princeton’s admissions program, “demographic and descriptive
information” of applicants and current Princeton students, and “narrative
responses” about Princeton’s admissions program.29
In its reverse FOIA, Princeton relied upon trade secret law to argue
against mandatory disclosure of both its “Applicant Documents and
21 Letter from Timothy C.J. Blanchard, Reg’l Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to
Christopher L. Eisgruber, President, Princeton Univ. 16 & n.12 (Nov. 5, 2014),
http://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/princeton-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TXN-NXLH].
22 Id.; See also Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 1–2.
23 Reverse FOIA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy
/2014/07/23/reverse-foia.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW36-868X] (describing a reverse FOIA action as a
legal measure, typically advanced by an entity who has previously submitted information to a
government agency pursuant to a third party’s (usually pending) FOIA request to prevent the disclosure
of some or all of the submitted information to the requesting third party).
24 See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 1–2.
25 Id. at 5.
26 Id. at 2, 6, 8.
27 Id. at 2.
28 Id. at 8.
29 These “narrative responses” were presumably submitted to the OCR by members of Princeton’s
Office of Admission, although Princeton’s Reverse FOIA does not make this clear. See id.
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Information” and “Admissions Documents and Information,” arguing that
these materials derived protections from two statutory sources of trade
secret law. First, Princeton argued that FOIA Exemption 4 protected its
admissions information from disclosure.30 Pursuant to a FOIA request
initiated by a third party, FOIA Exemption 4 exempts from disclosure
“trade secrets and commercial or financial information that is confidential
or privileged.”31 Princeton additionally argued that the Trade Secrets Act32
protects these materials from disclosure.33
Princeton’s invocation of these trade secret defenses provides the first
of many opportunities to illustrate the lack of uniformity across trade secret
statutory sources in drawing the line between what constitutes a trade secret
and what constitutes confidential business information, and the
implications that such designations may have on preventing public
disclosure of potentially reputationally-harmful information. The scope of
information which may receive trade secret status under FOIA Exemption
4 does not directly align with that of the Trade Secrets Act.34 The latter, a
criminal statute providing for the penalization of government employees
who make unauthorized trade secret disclosures, does not define what
constitutes a trade secret.35 However, courts have consistently construed the
Trade Secrets Act as proffering a broad view on what information should
receive trade secret protection, covering “practically any commercial or
financial data collected by any federal employee from any source.”36
Conversely, FOIA Exemption 4 provides an explicit trade secret
definition and seems to narrow the scope for what information may
constitute a trade secret. Under FOIA Exemption 4, a trade secret consists
of “a secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is
30

See id. at 3–4.
See What is FOIA?, supra note 19 (listing the nine FOIA exemptions).
32 See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 4 (noting that information covered by FOIA
Exemption 4 is typically also protected from disclosure by the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905,
which protects a broader range of information than FOIA Exemption 4 (citing Bartholdi Cable Co. v.
FCC, 114 F.3d 274, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1997))).
33 Princeton additionally relied upon FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C) and the Privacy Act of 1974 to
argue against disclosure of private and personally identifying information held within its “Applicant
Documents and Information” category. See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 13. FOIA
Exemption 6 covers information that would invade another individual’s personal privacy if disclosed,
and FOIA Exemption 7(C) covers information compiled for law enforcement purposes that “could
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. See What is FOIA?,
supra note 19 (listing the nine FOIA exemptions).
34 FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition: Exemption 4, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/oip
/foia-guide-2004-edition-exemption-4#N_492_ [https://perma.cc/8X8W-7AA2].
35 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2012) (Disclosure of Confidential Information).
36 FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition: Exemption 4, supra note 34 (quoting CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan,
830 F.2d 1132, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
31
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used for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade
commodities and that can be said to be the end product of either innovation
or substantial effort.”37 The Supreme Court seemingly quashed this
statutory discrepancy in scope in its 1978 ruling in Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, in which it ruled that any distinction in trade secret scope between
the statutes “is at most of limited practical significance in view of the
similarity of language between FOIA Exemption 4 and the substantive
provisions of § 1905.”38 Despite this ruling, some courts have construed
FOIA Exemption 4 as “defin[ing] the outer scope” of the Trade Secret
Act.39
While FOIA Exemption 4 may provide more guidance than the Trade
Secrets Act in determining whether certain information should receive
trade secret status, it still allows for ambiguity. The Department of Justice
makes clear that FOIA Exemption 4 protects two distinct categories of
information, the first being trade secrets, and the second being confidential
“commercial or financial information.”40 FOIA Exemption 4 seems to blur
the line dividing these two categories by including a “commercially
valuable plan” alongside a “formula, process, or device” in its trade secret
definition. This may signal to commercial entities that their confidential
business information is tantamount to a trade secret. The fact that some
FOIA exemptions cover relatively narrow classes of information
(Exemption 9, for example, covers “geological information on wells”) 41
may further justify such a conclusion, as it may suggest that FOIA’s
drafters have intentionally left together trade secrets and confidential
business information, rather than placing them into separate, narrower
exemptions. On the other hand, their simultaneous inclusion may indicate
that under FOIA Exemption 4, confidential “commercial or financial
information” exists squarely outside of the trade secret realm, as an
alternative construction would render at least part of the statute’s trade
secret definition superfluous.42
In its reverse FOIA action, Princeton relied on arguments supporting
both an Exemption 4 trade secret designation and an Exception 4
confidential business information categorization for the admissions

37

Id. (quoting Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir.
1983)).
38 441 U.S. 281 at n. 49.
39 Canal Refining Co. v. Corrallo, 616 F. Supp. 1035, 1042 (D.D.C. 1985).
40 FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition: Exemption 4, supra note 34.
41 See What is FOIA?, supra note 19 (listing the nine FOIA exemptions).
42 FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition: Exemption 4, supra note 34 (citing Anderson v. HHS, 907 F.2d 936,
944 (10th Cir. 1990)).
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materials it wished to shield from disclosure.43 Princeton highlighted the
fact that it restricted access of the admissions data at issue to only some
Admissions Office workers and required these individuals to sign nondisclosure agreements.44 Princeton also addressed the fact that its
admissions data is commercially valuable and that its disclosure risks
competitive harm, as required for both Exemption 4 trade secrets and a
showing of confidential business information.45 Specifically, Princeton
outlined three negative competitive consequences that would result from
the public disclosure of its admissions data.46 First, disclosure would allow
some applicants to tailor their applications based on inferences from the
released admissions data, which would in turn hinder Princeton’s efforts to
select the strongest class of incoming students in relation to competing elite
universities.47 Second, disclosure would allow competing universities to
access and utilize Princeton’s proprietary admissions strategies and
processes.48 Finally, Princeton argued that disclosure would deter potential
applicants from applying by reducing their confidence in Princeton’s ability
to keep their personal information and admissions materials confidential.49
The ambiguity in what information may constitute a trade secret
manifests in Princeton’s reverse FOIA action, in which the university
avoided explicitly applying trade secret designations to any of its
admissions material but still relied upon the Trade Secrets Act and
remedies typically afforded to trade secrets. Princeton requested injunctive
relief, maintaining that the public release of the “Applicant Documents”
and “Information and Admissions Documents and Information” would
cause the University “irreparable injury.”50 Injunctions are considered
“extraordinary relief,” even in FOIA matters,51 and courts are reluctant to

43 See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 6–12; see also FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition:
Exemption 4, supra note 34 (explaining that a FOIA Exemption 4 confidential “commercial or financial
information” designation requires a showing that disclosure will likely cause substantial competitive
harm to the submitter of information).
44 See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 9.
45 Id.; see also FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition: Exemption 4, supra note 34.
46 See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 9–10.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 10.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 10 (Princeton sought a permanent injunction based on its understanding that while the
reverse-FOIA action was still pending, the documents at issue would be held in abeyance, and should
the threat of disclosure during pendency arise, Princeton could submit a preliminary injunction request).
51 Guide to the Freedom of Information Act, U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/sites
/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/litigation-considerations.pdf#p17[https://perma.cc/GQ2E-Q88U].
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grant them pursuant to FOIA requests.52 However, trade secrets often
possess a presumption of irreparable harm upon their unwanted release,
paving the way for a higher grant-rate of injunctive relief by courts.53
Strategic litigators could make use of the indefiniteness of the bounds of
trade secret law to argue for the heightened levels of protection it may
afford, which may help explain the arguments employed in Princeton’s
reverse FOIA.
In September of 2017, the District Court for the District of Columbia
granted the Department of Education’s motion to stay the litigation in order
to address discrepancies documents planned for release, so the court’s view
on the merits of Princeton’s arguments remains unresolved.54 Nevertheless,
the case provides valuable insight into the ambiguity surrounding trade
secret law and perhaps illustrates a reliance on trade secret legal protections
to protect information with uncertain trade secret designation.
B. The Harvard Case: Use of Motion to Seal and Reliance on
“Confidential Business Information” Protections
While Harvard’s objective to shield its admissions materials from the
public matched Princeton’s, its arguments justifying such protection
differed significantly. Like Princeton, Harvard divided its admissions
materials into subcategories, listing three classifications in its Motion to
Seal.55 The first classification consisted of data related to undergraduate
applicant files, including completed applications, “summary sheets,” and
correspondences among those in the Admissions Office, alumni
interviewers, and high school guidance counselors.56 This first classification
mirrored Princeton’s “Applicant Documents and Information.” Harvard’s
second classification consisted of correspondences from external
organizations, alumni, and donors.57 Harvard primarily relied on privacy
law protections to prevent disclosure of its admissions materials in these
first two classifications, citing the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act (“FERPA”) (20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)) and privacy rights case law in its
Motion to Seal.58
52 Id. at 17 (citing Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States, No. CV F 07-1655 LJODLB, 2008 WL
108969, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008) (“[p]laintiff has not provided any authority for the proposition
that the claim for the Freedom of Information Act documents supports a claim for an injunction”)).
53 ELIZABETH A. ROWE & SHARON K. SANDEEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE SECRET LAW
448–49 (2d ed. 2017).
54 Status Report, Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 16, at 2.
55 See Harvard’s Motion to Seal, supra note 12, at 3.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 4, 8–12.
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The third classification, and the one most relevant to this Note,
consisted of Harvard’s confidential training materials, admissions
procedures, and statistics of admitted students.59 This classification closely
aligns with Princeton’s “Admissions Documents and Information.”60
Whether material existing under this classification rises to the level of trade
secret remains similarly questionable. Such information, however, almost
certainly possesses the potential to impose reputational harm on the
institution. Harvard’s controversial use of “personal ratings” in its
admissions criterion, for example, occupied much of the negative press
attention surrounding this case.61 In her recently delivered opinion, Judge
Burroughs discussed the personal ratings metric extensively, first
explaining that it “reflects the admissions officer’s assessment of what kind
of contribution the applicant would make to the Harvard community based
on their personal qualities.”62 SFFA relied heavily on admissions data
illustrating Harvard’s use of personal ratings in its expert report of Dr.
Peter Arcidiacono, Professor of Economics at Duke University. Dr.
Arcidiacono designed a logistic regression model to examine six years of
Harvard undergraduate admissions data, and his report, released at trial and
now part of the public record, concluded that Harvard’s personal rating
scores are biased against Asian American applicants.63 Attached to his
publicly available report are sets of admissions data which Harvard
strongly opposed filing unsealed.64 In her opinion, Judge Burroughs found
that while “[t]here is a statistical difference in the personal ratings with
white applicants faring better that [sic] Asian American applicants,” the
reason behind Asian American applicants’ lower scores is “unclear [] but
not the result of intentional discrimination.”65 Judge Burroughs did,
however, acknowledge that the public scrutiny and potential reputational
harm resulting from the publicization of these personal ratings may have
had an impact on Harvard’s admissions procedures going forward, making
note of Harvard’s overhaul of the use of personal ratings for the class of
2023.66
59

Id. at 3.
See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 2–3.
61 Anemona Hartocollis, Harvard Rated Asian-American Applicants Lower on Personality Traits,
Suit Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/15/us/harvard-asianenrollment-applicants.html [https://perma.cc/484H-VMRT].
62 See Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, supra note 2, at 20.
63 Id. at 60–61.
64 Id.; See also Joint Pretrial Memorandum, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President &
Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 14-cv-14176, at 18–19 (D. Mass. Oct. 1, 2018) [hereinafter SFFA Pretrial
Memorandum].
65 See Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, supra note 2, at 55–56.
66 Id. at 8.
60
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Unlike Princeton’s reverse FOIA, which cited both FOIA Exemption
4 and the Trade Secrets Act to argue against disclosure of its admissions
materials,67 Harvard’s Motion to Seal focused on doctrinal sources which
elevated the need to protect competitively harmful business information
above the public interest in accessing judicial records.68 However its
arguments, which centered around a showing of competitive harm, closely
matched Princeton’s. First, Harvard stated that the disclosure of its
admissions information may result in competitive harm, as undergraduate
applicants may attempt to “game the system” by altering their applications
to suit the preferences of Harvard’s Admissions Office and potentially
impair the ability of the Admissions Office to accurately assess its
candidates.69 In its next competitive harm argument, Harvard asserted that
the college-counseling industry may utilize previously confidential
admissions data to aid “well-resourced applicants,” thereby disadvantaging
other potentially well-qualified applicants.70 Finally, Harvard argued that
competing universities might use released admissions materials to refine
their own recruiting messages to potential applicants.71
Although Harvard did not explicitly call upon trade secret law to
justify sealing its admission data from the public record, it relied on case
law focusing almost exclusively on the protection of trade secrets. For
example, in its Motion to Seal, Harvard cited trade secret misappropriation
case CardiAQ Valve Technologies, Inc. v. Neovasc Inc. to argue that its
admissions data was “business information that might harm a litigant’s
competitive standing.”72 This suggests that Harvard may consider at least
some parts of its admissions materials trade secrets, although it stopped
short of explicitly designating them as such. However, unlike Princeton’s
reverse FOIA, which included an injunctive relief request, a remedy closely
associated with trade secret misappropriation, Harvard argued that its
admissions data should remain under seal at trial.
II. ADMISSIONS DATA SHOULD NOT QUALIFY AS A TRADE SECRET
Examinations of Princeton’s reverse FOIA and Harvard’s Motion to
Seal, both measures taken to block the release of confidential
67

See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 3.
Harvard’s Motion to Seal, supra note 12, at 7–9 (quoting United States v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47,
61 (1st Cir. 2013)).
69 Id. at 13.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 8–9. Harvard also relied upon other trade secrets misappropriation cases, including
Hilsinger Co. v. Eyeego, LLC, 2014 WL 5475032, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 29, 2014), and Bracco
Diagnostics Inc. v. Amersham Health Inc., 2007 WL 2085350 at *9–10 (D.N.J. July 18, 2007).
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undergraduate admissions data to the public, reveal that the universities
seem to rely in varying degrees upon trade secret law for protection of their
admissions information. From both statutory and judicial perspectives, this
reliance may illustrate an improper extension of trade secret law to cover
information that likely does not rise to the level of trade secret. The release
of most of Harvard’s admissions data into the public record during trial
against SFFA certainly seems to support this conclusion. Though Judge
Burroughs ruled in favor of Harvard, she found Harvard’s arguments to
shield its admissions data from the public record unpersuasive.73 During
trial, hundreds of formerly proprietary admissions documents, ranging from
Admissions Office reading procedures to inter-office emails, came to
light.74 In addition to denying Harvard’s Motion to Seal,75 Judge Burroughs
described Harvard’s admissions practices in great detail in her opinion,
quoting directly from its Interviewer Handbook76 and thoroughly describing
admissions practices such as the “lop process.” Judge Burroughs defined
the “lop process” as a mechanism Harvard’s Admissions Office employs
“[w]hen it becomes necessary to reduce the list of prospective admits. . . .”
and described the full committee meetings that took place in the final
stages of an admissions cycle, in which admissions officers would discuss
candidates again and then “lop,” or cut, some from the admitted students
list.77
The arguments employed by both Harvard and Princeton to protect
their admissions materials likely capable of reputational harm but of
questionable trade secret designation highlight the ambiguity surrounding
what may constitute a trade secret. Specifically, statutory sources exhibit
little uniformity with regards to how business information, the broad
category encompassing the type of information Harvard and Princeton
sought to protect, fits into trade secret law.78 The discrepancies between
FOIA Exemption 4 and the Trade Secret Act in defining the scope of
information qualifying as a trade secret, as seen in Princeton’s reverse
FOIA, exemplifies this lack of uniformity. Two other major statutory
sources of trade secret law, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the Defend
Trade Secrets Act (amending the Economic Espionage Act), provide
73

See Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, supra note 2.
Harvard’s Notice of Filing Corrected Admitted Exhibits List, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc.
v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No. 1:14-cv-14176-ADB (D. Mass. Nov. 14, 2018).
75 See Hartocollis, supra note 1.
76 See Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, supra note 2, at 25.
77 Id. at 26.
78 See David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769, 775–76 (2009). (“The dominant failure of a state-based trade
secret regime is that trade secret law differs from state to state.”).
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further illustrations of this statutory discord that may help explain the
propensity of entities to strain the boundaries of trade secret law.
The drafters of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”), enacted in
48 states,79 lamented the “undue uncertainty concerning the parameters of
trade secret protection” in their Prefatory Note to the 1985 version of the
Act.80 Unfortunately, this uncertainty remains present. The UTSA provides
a definition for a trade secret,81 elements of which several states have
adopted in their enactments.82 Unfortunately, applying this definition to the
SFFA cases does not result in an immediately obvious conclusion about
whether Princeton or Harvard’s admissions materials constitute trade
secreted information. The admissions data, including application packets,
admissions training materials, descriptions of admissions practices, and
admitted students’ statistics83 appears to qualify as “information,” a
“compilation,” or a “program,” as the UTSA’s definition initially requires.84
However, state-level enactments of the UTSA vary widely even at this
initial trade secret definitional question. Some states seem to place strong
limitations on the scope of business information eligible for trade secret
protection, requiring technical or scientific information to qualify. Courts in
such states would likely deny trade secret protection to admissions data,
which is neither particularly technical nor scientific. Nevada, for example,
has added to the UTSA’s trade secret definition preamble “product, system,
process, design, prototype, procedure, computer programming instruction
79

The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have also enacted the UTSA,
in addition to the 48 states mentioned. In 2018, the UTSA was enacted in Massachusetts and introduced
in New York. North Carolina has not adopted the UTSA. See Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=3a2538fb-e030-4e2da9e2-90373dc05792 [https://perma.cc/ZTQ7-KCFS].
80 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT: PREFATORY NOTE, 14 U.L.A. 531 (2005).
81 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or
process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy.
Id. § 1(4), at 538.
82 Id. GENERAL STATUTORY NOTE, at 533–535; see also Trade Secrets Laws and the UTSA: 50
State and Federal Law Survey, BECK REED RIDEN LLP (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.beckreedriden.com
/trade-secrets-laws-and-the-utsa-a-50-state-and-federal-law-survey-chart/
[https://perma.cc/26SQ5D85].
83 See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 2, 6, 8; see also Harvard’s Motion to Seal,
supra note 12, at 3.
84 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
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or code.”85 On the other hand, some states have amended the UTSA’s trade
secret definition to expressly include business or financial information, and
admissions materials likely face better odds for qualifying as trade secrets
in these jurisdictions. Georgia, for example, amended its trade secret
definition to include “financial data, financial plans, product plans, or a list
of actual or potential customers or suppliers.”86 Colorado’s UTSA
enactment enumerates references to both technical87 and confidential
business information.88 The admissions materials also likely meet the
UTSA’s requirement of a showing of “reasonable efforts” for maintaining
secrecy, as both institutions limited access to their admissions documents to
a select number of individuals within their admissions offices and required
these individuals to sign confidentiality agreements.89
The UTSA finally requires a showing of “independent economic
value” for information to qualify as a trade secret. The admissions
materials likely fail to fulfill this requirement, in which case arguments that
they should receive protection as trade secrets would illustrate an improper
extension of trade secret law. The “independent economic value”
requirement of the UTSA is more subject to state-level variation than the
statute’s other two trade secret requirements, further obfuscating the line
between trade secret and confidential business information. Colorado’s
statute appears to lower the bar set by the UTSA considerably, requiring
only that the information is “secret and of value.”90 Massachusetts, where
the trial between SFFA and Harvard took place, replaces “economic value”
with “economic advantage” in its UTSA enactment, seemingly
emphasizing that information qualifying as a trade secret should not only
possess economic value but must also be competitively valuable and
capable of producing an economic advantage.91
The arguments by Harvard in its Motion to Seal and Princeton in its
reverse FOIA that the disclosure of certain admissions materials would
result in competitive harm provide starting points for determining whether

85

NEV. REV. STAT. § 600A.030(5)(a) (2017).
GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-761 (2018).
87 COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-74-102 (2018) (“the whole or any portion or phase of any scientific or
technical information”).
88 Id. (“improvement, confidential business or financial information, listing of names, addresses, or
telephone numbers, or other information relating to any business or profession”).
89 Harvard’s Motion to Seal, supra note 12, at 17; Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 9;
see also David Almeling, Darin Snyder et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State
Courts, 46 Gonzaga L. Rev. 57, 82–83 (2010) (noting “confidentiality agreements with
employees . . . are the most important factors in the courts’ analysis of reasonable measures”).
90 COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-74-102 (2018), supra note 88.
91 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 42 (West 2018).
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these admissions materials possess sufficient economic value to qualify as
trade secrets. On one hand, these materials may possess sufficient
independent economic value because their release, as both institutions
argued,92 would allow potential applicants to strategically tailor their
applications to “game the system” and provide the college counseling
industry with coveted information.93 The measures that both institutions
took to keep their admissions procedures secret, such as their use of nondisclosure agreements and restricted access to admissions data, may further
suggest that such information possess independent economic value.94
Colorado’s enactment of the UTSA, requiring simply a showing of secrecy
and value, rather than independent economic value, would likely classify
the admissions materials of Harvard and Princeton as trade secrets.95
On the other hand, many courts have required a showing of actual
competitive harm to evidence independent economic value,96 a judicial
hurdle that Harvard and Princeton would be less likely to clear. Identifying
the institutions’ competitors is necessary to these actual competitive harm
inquiries, and an examination of the revenue sources of both Harvard97 and
Princeton98 aids this analysis. Endowments form the highest source of
revenue for both universities,99 and other elite educational institutions likely
occupy the associated endowment funding competitive space. It seems
unlikely that the release of admissions materials would threaten the
endowments awarded to Harvard and Princeton. Although endowments
remain subject to donors’ restrictions, their funds are typically managed on
a long-term basis, “established to exist in perpetuity.”100 Neither Harvard
92 See Princeton’s Reverse FOIA, supra note 14, at 9–10; see also Harvard’s Motion to Seal, supra
note 12, at 13.
93 See Harvard’s Motion to Seal, supra note 12, at 13.
94 Id.
95 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-74-102 (2018), supra note 87.
96 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commun. Servs., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1252–53 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (“A trade secret must have sufficient value in the owner’s operation of its enterprise such that it
provides an actual or potential advantage over others who do not possess the information.”).
97 Financial Report: Fiscal Year 2017, HARVARD UNIV., https://finance.harvard.edu/files/fad/files
/final_harvard_university_financial_report_2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D5MH-J8KT]
(Harvard’s
sources of revenue for 2017 consisted of the following: 36% endowment income, 21% student fees,
18% sponsored support, 9% gifts, and 16% other sources).
98 Financial
Facts, PRINCETON UNIV., https://finance.princeton.edu/princeton-financialoverv/financial-facts/index.xml [https://perma.cc/2M38-B2TG] (Princeton’s sources of revenue for
2017 consisted of the following: 47% endowment income, 18% student fees, 18% sponsored support,
5% gifts, and 12% other sources).
99 Id.; See Financial Report: Fiscal Year 2017, supra note 97, at 5.
100 Facts About College and University Endowments, ASS’N OF AMERICAN UNIV. (Jan. 26, 2009),
https://www.aau.edu/key-issues/facts-about-college-and-university-endowments
[https://perma.cc/X7X6-2SY8].
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nor Princeton advanced evidence that the release of their admissions
materials would diminish these endowments, their highest revenue sources,
and supply competing universities with the increased funding.
Student tuition and fees make up the next highest revenue sources for
Harvard and Princeton.101 Again, competitors in this revenue space likely
comprise other elite universities. The likelihood of showing competitive
harm, either actual or potential, here is especially low. The number of
applications to Harvard and Princeton have continued to climb, with both
schools receiving their highest number of applications to date for the class
of 2022 (42,749 and 35,370, respectively).102 More importantly, Harvard
and Princeton’s overall acceptance rates are the lowest to date and are
amongst the lowest in the Ivy League (4.6% and 5.5%, respectively).103
Such low acceptance rates and high application numbers likely render
claims that released admissions data could harm tuition revenue
unconvincing. Even arguments that disclosure of data describing previously
admitted students may allow admitted students more bargaining power in
financial aid negotiations seem to fall flat. Admitted students may use such
data to more accurately assess their “worth” in the world of admissions, but
revenue from student fees hovers only around 20% for both institutions.104
Possible decreases in fee revenues resulting from more targeted negotiation
practices by admitted students is unlikely to make much of a financial dent
for both universities, and thus, is unlikely to support a showing of potential
competitive harm. Furthermore, Harvard and Princeton’s increasingly low
admissions rates indicate that even in the face of increased admissions
transparency, the universities retain the ultimate power of choice in their
admissions processes, maintaining their abilities to attract the top academic
talent.
Harvard and Princeton also both claimed that potential competitive
harm may result from other universities’ usage of their proprietary
admissions training materials and procedures. However, a finding of
competitive harm here is also unlikely. While other universities may find

101

See Financial Report: Fiscal Year 2017, supra note 99; see also Financial Facts, supra note

100.
102 Rose Lincoln, 1,962 admitted to Class of ‘22, HARVARD GAZETTE (Mar. 18, 2018),
https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2018/03/1962-admitted-to-harvard-college-class-of-22/
[https://perma.cc/FJ7M-TXAL]; Admission Statistics, PRINCETON UNIV. (July 15, 2018),
http://admission-dev.princeton.edu/how-apply/admission-statistics [https://perma.cc/L2HF-UTPJ].
103 Ivy League Statistics by College, IVY COACH, https://www.ivycoach.com/ivy-league-statisticsby-college/ [https://perma.cc/BAZ3-JM78] The other ivy league schools have the following overall
acceptance rates for the class of 2022: Columbia 5.5% (tied with Princeton), Yale 6.3%, Brown 7.2%,
Penn 8.4%, Dartmouth 8.7%, and Cornell 10.3%.
104 See Financial Report: Fiscal Year 2017, supra note 97; see also Financial Facts, supra note 98.
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some value in accessing these admissions materials, they likely will not
extract much competitively advantageous information, as the activities of
the admissions offices of Harvard and Princeton likely play only a small
role in luring applicants. Instead, students often target elite universities
such as Harvard and Princeton based on prestigious reputations and
opportunities to obtain upward economic and social mobility.105
Furthermore, in the face of increased competition among student applicants
and the relative ease of submitting multiple applications, facilitated by the
Common Application, many students now submit twenty to thirty college
applications, targeting a broad range of “ultracompetitive” universities.106
Thus, even if other institutions managed to use released admissions
materials to lure more applicants, they likely would not successfully deter
these applicants from also applying to Harvard and Princeton. A finding of
actual competitive harm to these institutions is therefore unlikely, and the
many courts that require such a finding to evidence independent economic
value would likely not consider the admissions materials trade secrets.
However, given the statutory discord in identifying what information may
constitute a trade secret, some courts may reach an alternate conclusion.
The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), amending the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996, narrowed the UTSA’s trade secret definition,
aligning closely with certain state-level UTSA enactments which raised the
bar for trade secret status.107 Unfortunately, even with the federal passage of
the DTSA, significant ambiguity still arises in trade secret determinations.
Given that Harvard’s admissions numbers remain strong following the
release of some of its proprietary admissions procedures, it seems that the
institution’s primary concern was preventing bad publicity and reputational
harm. The same likely holds true for Princeton. Many courts have noted
that in determining whether information possesses sufficient economic
value to constitute a trade secret, economic advantage and competitive
105 Raj Chetty et al., Mobility Report Cards: The Role of Colleges in Intergenerational Mobility
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23618, 2017), http://www.equality-ofopportunity.org/papers/coll_mrc_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5K2-UCKE] (noting that “colleges that
channel the most children from low- or middle-income families to the top 1% are almost exclusively
highly selective institutions, such as UC–Berkeley and the Ivy-Plus colleges.”).
106 Ariel Kaminer, Applications by the Dozen, as Anxious Seniors Hedge College Bets, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/nyregion/applications-by-the-dozen-as-anxiousstudents-hedge-college-bets.html [https://perma.cc/Y7RH-8UEG].
107 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376, 380–81 (amending 18
U.S.C. § 1839 to read “the term ‘trade secret’ means all forms and types of financial, business,
scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information . . . if (A) the owner thereof has taken
reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and (B) the information derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the
disclosure or use of the information . . . .”).
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harm must be present. Reputational harm alone will not satisfy this
requirement.108 Harvard and Princeton’s reliance on the elevated legal
remedies typically afforded to trade secrets, such higher injunctive relief
grant-ratees, seems then to improperly stretch the bounds of trade secret
law. Given that companies typically regard their reputations as one of their
most valuable assets,109 litigation strategies pursuing the strongest legal
protections available is unsurprising. Accordingly, entities wishing to rely
on the protections of trade secret law to shield dubious, embarrassing
information from the public “will use all available arguments to their
advantage and thus they have an incentive to find, emphasize, and litigate
the variations in state trade secret laws.”110
The varying degrees of reliance by Harvard and Princeton on trade
secret law to argue for withholding admissions data fall in line with several
recent examples of attempts to use trade secret law to protect reputationally
harmful information that has questionable trade secret status. In a genderbased class action employment discrimination lawsuit, decided in February
of 2018, Microsoft attempted to claim information related to its company
diversity and inclusion data as trade secrets and seal the information from
the public record.111 This information included training materials and
“action plans” aimed at enhancing Microsoft’s workplace diversity.112 The
court found that the release of this information may competitively harm
Microsoft and found that “Microsoft’s argument that its diversity initiatives
and strategies are trade secrets to be very persuasive.”113 The information
Microsoft wished to shield from disclosure also included demographic
statistics, the number of internal complaints lodged by Microsoft
employees, and the number of times Microsoft determined that its
employees violated company policies.114 Here, however, the court noted
that “tension” exists between “information that may harm a litigant’s
competitive standing and information that is simply embarrassing or
incriminating to the business” and ultimately determined that these
108 Cook Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 206 F.R.D. 244, 248 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (“[B]usiness information
whose release harms the holder only because the information is embarrassing or reveals weaknesses
does not qualify for trade secret protection.”).
109 James Agarwal et al., Corporate Reputation Measurement: Alternative Factor Structures,
Nomological Validity, and Organizational Outcomes, J. BUS. ETHICS 130, 485, 502 (2015) (“[G]eneral
corporate reputation directly leads to a set of valuable organizational outcomes . . . creating additional
value for all its stakeholders”).
110 Almeling, supra note 78, at 776.
111 Moussouris v. Microsoft Corp., No. 15-cv-1483 JLR, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34685 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 16, 2018).
112 Id. at *38.
113 Id.
114 Id. at *20, *38.
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materials did not constitute trade secrets.115 The Microsoft case illustrates
the difficulties in delineating what information is simply reputationally
harmful and what information may cause competitive harm worthy of trade
secret protection.
CONCLUSION
The recent Students for Fair Admissions cases against Harvard and
Princeton help illustrate the ambiguity of trade secret law and the resulting
attempts to capitalize on this ambiguity to shield reputationally harmful
business information. Statutes vary at the threshold issue of definition for a
trade secret, leaving uncertain what information may qualify for trade
secret protection. The lack of uniformity among the main statutory sources
of trade secret law in determining trade secret status may help explain the
amorphous nature of trade secret law.
The existence of at least some ambiguity in statutes is to be expected
and, in some cases, is introduced by legislators intentionally to shift more
interpretative latitude to the judiciary. With that said, the heightened legal
protections afforded to trade secrets almost certainly incentivize strategic
litigators to pursue trade secret claims for reputationally harmful business
information. Such incentivization may impose societal harm when the
disclosure of certain information may have better served the interests of the
public. Increased transparency surrounding college admissions may go
towards achieving this end, given that experiencing “existential angst”
about the admissions process has become “a national rite of passage” for
high school seniors.116 The release of collegiate admissions materials may
at least allow students to pull back the curtain slightly on the opaque world
of college admissions, hopefully helping to reduce some of their anxieties.
The disclosure of Microsoft’s diversity and inclusion data similarly may
provide public benefit by providing workers the opportunity to make
better-informed employment decisions.
The route to preventing public disclosure of information that may not
rise to the level of a trade secret but which possesses business information
capable of reputational harm, results, at least in part, from trade secret
statutory ambiguity. The arguments employed by Harvard and Princeton in
the SFFA cases illustrate a straining of the boundaries of trade secret
115

Id. at *33 (The court further noted that “Microsoft’s concern is that the release of the data would
have a negative effect on its reputation and not so much that it is a trade secret.”).
116 Bill McGarvey, We’re sacrificing our kids’ mental health to the college admission industrial
complex, AMERICA MEDIA (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.americamagazine.org/politicssociety/2019/04/04/were-sacrificing-our-kids-mental-health-college-admission-industrial
[https://perma.cc/CD82-FM86].
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protections, likely made possible by this lack of uniformity in trade secret
statutes. The resulting incentivization for litigators to take advantage of this
statutory ambiguity to obtain more favorable legal remedies may threaten
the public interest by depriving the public of beneficial information. Trade
secret law remains amorphous and in a state of constant flux. Legislators,
judges, and others who help define it should remain vigilant in ensuring
that it does not give way to pressures to cover information undeserving of
its protections.
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